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ABSTRACT: The literature on Mergers and Acquisitions activity has espoused
various explanations for M&A activity. Some of this captures the nature of
defence mechanisms again takeovers. In all the expositions the agency con‡icts
and degrees of collusion among the claimants to the …rm’s cash-‡ows, are
apparent. In this paper we add to the literature by presenting an integrated
framework that classi…es manager behavior and corporate governance, and show
how a manager can use M&A bids as a vehicle for maximising their own bene…ts,
rather than shareholder value. The M&A bid targeted by the manager could
simply be for diversionary reasons that seek to enable the manager to hold on to
his employment and bene…ts, even though he may be a poor manager. We also
consider M&A activity that bene…ts both managers and shareholders. In this
analysis, M&A activity is driven by the manager’s appetite for M&A activity,
both bene…cial and unbene…cial. The analysts, who are employed by investment
banks, that advise on the M&A activity, collude with management. The analysts
forecast in‡ated earnings for a company because the fees they earn as a portion
of what the investment bank earns, are related to the size of the transaction
which in turn is determined by the in‡ated future earnings. The agency con‡icts
between shareholders, investment banks and their analysts, and managers of the
company, are central to our framework.
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1 Introduction
The advent of signi…cant corporate collapses linked to mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) and accounting scandals, in the last few years, has not only re-
sulted in managers being prosecuted and companies being sued by investors,
but has also led to investment banks being …ned for their seemingly mis-
leading earnings forecasts on these companies. Weak corporate governance
and poor compliance procedures have been linked to the rise of many re-
cent corporate scandals (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). The Enron debacle,
among others, has come to epitomise the nature of the phenomenon. Some
M &A activities have not been bene…cial to shareholders.1 The wave of cor-
porate scandals has culminated in increasing the e¤ectiveness of reporting
standards, general statutory compliance and the tightening of corporate gov-
ernance rules via various means including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley rules have impacted …rms’ consider-
ation of the costs of staying public (Engel et al., 2004) and altered their focus
toward compliance rather than earnings managed growth (Li et al., 2004).
Suppression of information in relation to agency costs is likely to remain an
important issue as corporate governance strictures take e¤ect (Arya et al.,
1998; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Demski and Frimor, 1999; Indjejikian and
Nanda, 1999). The introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is matched by
a reduction in M&A activity as compliance has gained prominence over ac-
quisitive growth in some sectors. For instance, in the …rst quarter of 2000
global M&A activity was valued at nearly US$1.2 trillion. Over the next 24
months global M&A activity dropped to about US$300 billion and remained
‡at up to the end of 2003. M&A activity subsequently began to rise reaching
a level of about US$500 billion in the fourth quarter of 2004.2 During the
1An example, is the merger of Time Warner and American Online (AOL) in the year
2000, which seems not to have delivered bene…ts to shareholders but to have driven Time
Warner to engage in aggressive accounting practices evidenced by AOL. On Wed, 15
December 2004, Time Warner announced that it had agreed to pay US$510 million, as
settlement for criminal and civil investigations associated with AOL. This settlement will
allow the company to return to raising capital from debt and capital markets which it
had di¢culty accessing while the lawsuits remained with the spectre of being forced to
restate its …nancial results. The company is expected to be able to now pursue potential
acquisitions and focus on growth rather than compliance (see Financial Times, 12/7/2004,
page 24).
2In December 2004 alone the M&A deals announced include, Johnson and Johnson
in the healthcare sector having agreed to take over Guidant for US$425 billion in cashCorporate Goverance 2
period from 2001 to 2003, companies were focusing oncompliance as opposed
to seeking growth opportunities - a trend that is now beginning to reverse.
The literature on Mergers and Acquisitions activity has espoused vari-
ous explanations for M&A activity (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003;
Baghat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Chang, 1990; Comment and Schwert,
1995; Gaughan, 2002; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Hellwig, 2000; Holmstrom
and Kaplan, 2001; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Some of this literature seeks
to explain and capture the nature of defence mechanisms against takeovers.
In these expositions, the agency con‡icts and the strength of collusion among
the claimants to the …rm’s cash ‡ows, are apparent.
In the literature, corporate governance and the behavior of the managers
in the companies that engage in M&A activity and analysts who forecast
earnings, have not received much attention as combined explanatory factors
ofthe level of M&Aactivity. The analysts are employees ofinvestment banks
who also advise on M&A activity and strategies. This paper presents an in-
tegrated framework that characterises sel…sh manager behavior and poor
corporate governance that result in managers seeking to use M&A activity
as a vehicle for maximising their own bene…ts, rather than shareholder value.
The M&A targeted by the manager may also have diversionary characteris-
tics such as to enable the manager to hold on to his (his is used to refer to
his or her in this paper) employment and bene…ts, even though poor perfor-
mance is in evidence. We also consider M&A activity that bene…ts both the
managers and shareholders. In our framework, the M&A activity is driven
by the manager’s appetite for M&A activity, both bene…cial and unbene…-
cial. The analysts who are employed by investment banks that advise on the
M&A activity, forecast in‡ated earnings for a company because the fees the
investmentbanks earn, are relatedto the size ofthe transactionwhichinturn
is determined by the in‡ated future earnings. The agency con‡icts between
shareholders, investment banks and their analysts, and the managers of the
…rms involved, are central to our framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents dif-
ferent characteristics of managers and develops a general equilibrium model
for M&A activity under conditions of good corporate governance. Section III
and stock; Symantec took-over Veritas software for US$13.5 billion in stock; Noble energy
merged with Patina Oil and Gas in cash and stock deal worth US$3.4 billion; United
Technologies acquisition of Kidde of UK for US$2.8 billion; Cedant’s purchase of UK-
based Gullivers Travel Associates and the online unit of Octopus travel group for US41.1
billion in cash (see Financial Times, 12/17/2004, page 1).Corporate Goverance 3
analyses the supply ofM&Aactivity underconditions ofgood and bad corpo-
rate governance, whileSection IV discusses the role of regulatory institutions.
In Section V, we develop a model for analyst behavior and conditions for in-
centive compatibility. Section VI considers the analyst attitude to risk and
their liability, while Section VII seeks to characterize the nature of potential
shareholder-loss and analyst-liability when analysts overstate a company’s
earnings. Section VIII concludes.
2 General Equilibrium of M&A activity under Good
Corporate Governance
We assume there are a large number of companies each owned by identical
types of individuals. We also assume that corporate leaders, whom we shall
refer to as managers, are subjected to a two (2) term employment contract
arrangement for theperiods {0, T} and{T+1, 2T} whichare equal in length.
The ability to subject managers to a …nite employment contract constitutes
what we call “good corporate governance”. If the shareholders or indeed
its representative board are unable to terminate the manager’s contract at
the end of his …rst term or the manager is able to in‡uence his own re-
appointment process when deemed to have performed badly, then there is
“poor corporate governance”.
In this section we consider the company to be operating under conditions
of good corporate governance. The manager possesses characteristics that
determine the value of the company and subsequently, the welfare of the
shareholders while they lead the company. The managers are drawn from
the population and new candidates are appointed at the beginning of each
contract periodby a Boardof Directors that represents the interests of share-
holders. A poor manager is only punished at the end of the …rst period {0,
T} when the incumbent’s contract is not renewed, which constitutes good
corporate governance practice.
We initiate theanalysisof the problemby using aframework developedby
Hess and Orphanides (2001). Let the consumption stream of shareholders,
cit be determined by earnings, dt minus the cost of an M&A process, kt.
First, we will consider a situation where the M&A process does not yield
any bene…ts to the shareholders, and indeed may only possess diversionary
characteristics, and accentuate the manager’s sel…sh behavior. In this caseCorporate Goverance 4
the consumption of shareholders is given by:
ct = dt +stkt (1)
where st takes the value of one (1) if there is M&A activity and zero(0) if
there is no M&A activity. Also assume that dt and kt are drawn from cumu-
lative distributions H(dt)and G(kt). We also assume that there is symmetric
information between managers and shareholders, and each manager’s abili-
ties are only known when appointed to the position. The shareholders are
risk-neutral and appoint, through their Board of Directors, a manager who
maximizes expected welfare, Wt, given by:
Wt = Et§®
s¡tcs (2)
where ® is a discount factor, 0 < ® < 1. While in o¢ce, the manager derives
rents (salaries and bene…ts) F. The manager is partially benevolent and
maximizes a weighted average of their rents and shareholder’s welfare. If is
the probability that a manager is re-appointed, then the manager’s welfare
function is:
Vt = (1¡ ¼)Wt + ¼(F + ®F¢) (3)
where ¼ is a measure of the manager’s sel…shness, as ¼ measures the weight
he attaches to his ownrents from being in o¢cethan toshareholder’s welfare.
2.1 Manager-Type and Re-Appointment Dynamics
Now let us consider the dynamics of the re-appointment of the manager.
We classify the managers into …ve( 5) categories namely: bad manager; sat-
isfactory and sel…sh manager I; satisfactory and sel…sh manager II; good
manager; and star-performing manager. The shareholders consider the level
of the earnings stream, dt, as an important factor in choosing a manager.
When the earning stream is high, dhigh then any manager who produces
dt ¸ dhigh will be re-appointed, even if they engage in an unpro…table M&A
process which results in no change in the earning, but incurs M&A cost of kt.
Let us also de…ne the lowest earning stream so that any manager who pays
out dt < dlow would not have their contract renewed at time T + 1, even if
they engaged in an M&A process. Therefore, the re-appointment of a man-
ager depends on dlow and dhigh relative to dt. There is also a critical earningCorporate Goverance 5
stream d¤¤ such that when dt ¸ d¤¤ the manager would be re-appointed with
no M&A process undertaken and the re-appointment only depends on dt:
Next we de…ne shareholder’s welfare, W1, which is associated with a new
manager of unknown characteristics. When there are two or more candi-
dates, the shareholders will only evaluate if their expected welfare associated
with re-appointing the incumbent manager exceeds W1 on the basis of the
information known about the incumbent. If so, then they would re-appoint
the incumbent, otherwise not. Then, the re-appointment conditions for the
incumbent, denoted by i, are:
di + µki ¸ W1(1¡ ®) (4)
where µ is the exogenous probability of being involved in M&A activity.
For each company µ, is exogenous but can be endogenized by aggregating
across all companies. From (4) we notice that the incumbent will only be re-
appointed if the consumption bene…ts exceed or are equal to those generated
by an alternative candidate. Therefore, with the absence of M&A activity,
re-appointment is guaranteed for any d ¸ d¤¤, such that d¤¤ is given by:
d
¤¤ = W1(1¡ ®) ¡ µk
¤ (5)
where k¤ is the expectation of k given by k given by k¤ = ¡pK, where K
is the cost of M&A activity and p is its probability of it being incurred. In
other words, the cost of M&A activity characteristic k, is equal to ¡K with
probability p and zero with probability 1 ¡ p. Therefore, K measures the
execution capacity of M&A bids for the manager. From (5) we see that the
critical earnings level d¤¤ is one that is equal to the welfare associated with
a new manager net of expected M&A costs.
Next, let us consider the expression for dhigh which is that the manager
is so good at his job as to produce a high earning such that the manager is
re-appointed even though poor M&A execution skills are evident with costs
k = ¡K. Then, if:
di ¡ µK ¸ W1(1¡ ®) (6)
then
dhigh = minf1;W1(1 ¡ ®)+ µKg (7)Corporate Goverance 6
When µ is high, then dhigh is equal to one(1) or the earning yield is
100% of whatever is potentially possible. We can see that a manager with
characteristics d 2 fd¤¤;dhighg gets re-appointed regardless and are therefore
least interested in M&A activity. This is a “good manager”.
A “bad manager” is one such that:
di < W1(1 ¡®) (8)
And indeed a “bad manager” is one with the characteristics dlow such
that :
dlow = maxf0;W1(1 ¡®)g (9)
Note that “bad managers” are such that d 2 f0;dlowg Bad managers
avoid M&A activity as they do not enhance their re-appointment prospects.
We can see that the relevant region is d 2 fdlow;d¤¤g where M&A activity
may lead to re-appointment but his contract would not be renewed in the
absence of M&A activity on their part. This is a “satisfactory (but sel…sh)
manager”. What then determines the manager’s desire to pursue M&A ac-
tivity is the di¤erence between his welfare in the absence of M&A activity
(V0) and welfare with M&A activity (Vt0). Then,
V0 = (1 ¡ ¼)(d+ ®W1)+ ¼F (10)
and
Vt0 = (1¡ ¼)[d ¡pK + p®W1+ (1¡ p)®(d+ ®W1)] (11)
+¼[F + (1¡ p)®F]
IfV0¡Vt0 > 0;8d 2 (dlow;d¤);then the manager willinitiate M&Aactivity
for any d and will act in the interest of shareholders.
If V0 ¡ Vt0 < 0;8d 2 (dlow;d¤); the manager will initiate M&A activity
whenever he can raise his chances of re-appointment. This is the case of a
‘sel…sh manager’. Solving V0 ¡ Vt0 = 0 for d yields.
d0 = (1 ¡ ®)W1 + pK=(1¡ p)® ¡ ¼F=(1 ¡ ¼) (12)Corporate Goverance 7
Then, we can de…ne d¤ such that the manager will only engage in M & A
activity if d 2 fd¤;d¤¤g Then d¤ is given by
d¤ = minfmax(dlow;d0);d¤¤g (13)
We can see from expressions from d0 and d¤ that the decision to embark
on M&A activity depends on the manager’s degree of sel…shness ¼. Then,
the minimum ¼; namely ¼¤; such that the manager behaves sel…shly is one
such that dlow = d0; and is given by:
¼¤ = pK=[pK +®F (1 ¡ p)] (14)
If ¼ > ¼¤; then the manager will initiate M&A activity whenever dlow
· d · d¤¤ this indistinguishable from the case of a manager who is totally
sel…sh with ¼ = 1; such that d¤ = dlow:
The unconditional probability of the manager being re-appointed, J (µ),
is determined by the type of manager as de…ned by …ve possible regions of d
namely
² Region 1: Bad manager with characteristics d 2 f0;dlowg has a zero
probability of re-appointment;
² Region 2: Satisfactory and sel…sh manager I with characteristics d 2
fdlow;d¤g has re-appointment probability µ(1 ¡p);
² Region 3: Satisfactory and sel…sh manager II with characteristics d 2
fd¤;d¤¤g has re-appointment probability (1¡ p);
² Region 4: Good manager with characteristics d 2 fd¤¤;dhighg has re-
appointment probability (1¡ µ) +µ(1 ¡p); and
² Region 5: Star-performing manager with characteristics d 2 fdhigh;1g
has a re-appointment probability of one(1).
Then the unconditional probability of a manager’s re-appointment is
given by:
J (µ) = (d¤ ¡ dlow)µ(1 ¡ p)+(d¤¤ ¡ d¤)(1¡ p) (15)
+(dhigh ¡ d
¤¤)(1¡ µp)+(1 ¡dhigh)Corporate Goverance 8
2.2 The Quantity of Global M&A Activity
The probability that a new manager will initiate M&A activity is





and theprobability ofre-appointmentis de…nedin expression (15) above. We
now wish to determine the expected frequency with which a company will
have a manager facing the temptation of engaging in M&A activity. These
would be managers in their …rst term contract and having poor management
skills and without any proven record of e¢ciently handling M&A activity.
Let this fraction of companies be f(µ). Let us …rst determine the frequency
that a company has a manager serving the …rst term of his contract in period
j. Let the Mj denote that the manager is in his …rst term in period j, and
1¡ Mj denote that the manager is in his second term of the contract. Now
consider a Markov process for whether a company has amanager who is in his
…rst term of the contract of employment. If the manager is serving his …rst
term, the probability with which a manager will be serving his …rst term in
the subsequent period is 1¡J(µ) = Pr(Mt+1jMt). If the current manager
is not serving his …rst term, since managers may serve only up to two terms,
this manager may not be re-appointed. Then the probability with which a
manager is serving his …rst term in the subsequent period is one (1), that is,
Pr(Mt+ 1 j 1 » Mt) = 1 (17)
Then, a transition probability matrix can be constructed, indicating the term
served by a company’s manager.
From the transition probability matrix we can show that the uncondi-
tional frequency or stationary probability with which a manager will be serv-
ing his …rst term is,
Á(µ) = 1=[1 +J (µ)] (18)
Since we assume that only managers serving their …rst term engage in M&A
activity and they face this possibility with probability B, then the frequency
with which a company’s manager will contribute to the quantity of M&A
activity is:
f (µ) = B(µ)Á(µ) (19)Corporate Goverance 9




the sum of the frequencies for n companies.
2.3 M&A Equilibrium
We consider the notion of equilibrium when there is a large number of com-
panies. Here one company’s avoidable M&A bid could be another company’s
unavoidable M&A bid. We need to determine the probability with which a
…rm not seeking an M&A bid is forced into an M&A bid if a fraction, f, of
companies seek M&A bid. We shall refer to thecompanies seeking M&A bids
as “hawks”, f, and those seeking to avoid M&A bids as “doves”, 1-f. Then
is the probability that a dove is involved in an M&A bid with a hawk. Let
each hawk be matched with a dove with probability . Then the probability
of unavoidable M&A bids is:
µ = !f=(1¡ f) = (fraction of doves matched with hawks) (21)
If f = 0, then doves are never attacked and µ = 0: If a hawk is always
matched with a dove then ! = 1; and the equilibrium condition is:
µ = f=(1 ¡ f) (22)
However, in equilibrium
! = 1¡ f (23)
and
µ = f (24)
This means that in equilbrium, the probability of being drawn into an M&A
bid is equal to the proportion of “hawks” in the population of companies.
Then an M&A activity equilibrium is characterised by the pair fµ;fg which
satis…es the contribution to M&A activity in (19) and the equilibrium con-
dition (24).
3The number M&A deals globally during 2004 was 28 664 compared to 28642 in 2003
(see Business Day, 1/3/2005)Corporate Goverance 10
3 Bene…cial M&A Activity
In the analysis above we have considered a scenario where the M&A activity
is not bene…cial to shareholders and is therefore diversionary on the part
of the manager. In this section we now consider a scenario where there
is poor corporate governance, and the Manager cannot be dislodged from
his position, even when he is a bad manager. But also there are scenarios
where there is good corporate governance and the right level of shareholder
activism, and M&A activities could produce positive bene…ts.
3.1 Good Corporate Governance and Bene…cial M&A
Activity
Weconsider a situation where acompany is presentedwithan opportunity to
initiate an M&A bid. The manager realises such an opportunity with prob-
ability, ': These M&A bids result in bene…ts, d2, in the form of additional
earning ‡ows to shareholders. In this case the consumption stream for each
shareholder is now,
ct = d + kt + d2 (25)
The decision to engage in M&A activity now depends on the size of d2.
Thereare two(2) possible scenarios. The …rstoneiswhere amanager engages
inM&Aactivity, extracting bene…ts even if the manager is apoorexecutioner
of M&A bids. In this case there will always be M&A activity. The second
case is where bene…ts are extracted and the manager is well supported by
shareholders and he has proven skills in executing M&A activity. If the
manager has excellent execution capabilities, then k = 0, and the manager
will engage in M&A activity after they have proved their execution abilities.
The overall frequency with which a company with good corporate gover-
nance will contribute to M&A activity is then:
f
G(µ) = B (µ)Á(µ)+ 'z (µ) (26)
where z(µ) ¸ 0 is the frequency of managers who are currently serving their
second terms in their contract of employment and have acquired good M&A
experience from the …rst term of their contracts. The …rst term in (26) cap-
tures the pointless M&A motive (diversionary motive) as in expression (19).Corporate Goverance 11
The second term in (26) captures the additional bene…cial M&A activity
component. In (26) if µ = 0, then the quantity of M&A activity is also zero
(0);z(0) = 0: However, if a manager engages in M&A bids he may not know
how good he is and does not get experience. In other words the manager has
to be engaged in non-bene…cial M&A bids in his …rst term in order to have
experience to pursue another M&A bid with success in their second term. If
µ > 0, then the engagement in M&A bids by companies with good corporate
governance is positive. The supply of appropriate M&A activity is always
less than ' regardless of µ.
3.2 M& A activity under Poor Corporate Governance
Hereweconsidera situationwhere there is poor corporate governanceandthe
manager has a constant probability of remaining employed for an additional
term independent of his performance abilities and capabilities in handling
M&A bids. We refer to these managers as dictatorial managers. At the risk
of oversimpli…cation, dictatorial managers could include managers who are
also founders of the company that they manage but havesince beenjoinedby
other shareholders in the ownership of the company. Such managers create
the scenario where they are so closely identi…ed with the company that their
personalities re‡ect the characteristics of the company. In this case it means
dictatorial managers need not engage in diversionary M&A activity and in-
deed have no incentive to engage in such activity. This means if managers
were dictatorial they are not likely to contribute to diversionary and wasteful
M&A bids because they do not need to. The interesting result is that poor
corporate governance which supports dictatorial managers gives the man-
agers an incentive to engage in bene…cial M&A activity! This perverse result
seems to suggest that improving the corporate governance requirements, as
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does, is more likely to result in pointless M&A activ-
ity with strong diversionary characteristics. However, by being dictatorial,
the manager will expropriate the bene…ts of M&A bids, d2, and not pay that
out as dividends to shareholders but pay that as a bonus to themselves, and
the shareholders bare the costs k. Then the dictatorial manager will initiate
an M&A bid only if it is bene…cial, and the bene…ts ‡ow to themselves and
not the shareholders.
The supply of M&A activity under poor corporate governance is fB = ':
In this case if all companies had poor corporate governance then the equilib-
rium frequency of M&A activity would be ' . Notice that the equilibriumCorporate Goverance 12
supply of M&A activity under poor corporate governance is higher that un-
der good corporate governance, that is ' > fG(µ). This ties in with the
empirical evidence we presented above where before the introduction of the
Sarbanes-Oxley act M&A activity was high and dropped substantially after
its introduction in year 2001.
3.3 M&A Activity Under both Good and Poor Cor-
porate Governance
In the real world we have the co-existence of companies operating under
both good and bad governance conditions. Under these conditions, would
the frequency of M&A activity be lower than that under good governance
conditions? Let the fraction of companies with good governance be ´ and
those with bad governance be 1¡´ . In this case the global supply of M&A
activity would be the weighted average
f
T (µ) = ´f
G(µ) +(1 ¡ ´)f
B(µ) (27)
where fG(µ) is de…ned in equation (26) and fB(µ) = ':Let us consider the
case where the manager is sel…sh, that is ¼ > ¼¤:If all companies practice
good governance, then ´ = 1;and the supply of M&A activity is fG(µ) and
frequency of M&A activity is fG(µ): If all the global companies are prac-
ticing poor corporate governance then the global supply of M&A activity
is fB (µ) = ': In reality the global supply of M&A activity is a weighted
average of the two extreme scenarios, and as to whether the supply of M&A
activity increases or falls depends onwhether fG(µ) is greater or smaller than
';the availability of M&A opportunities. In other words, the supply of M&A
activity could increase or indeed fall, compared to the case of universal good
corporate governance.
4 Role of Regulatory Institutions in M&A Activity
Above we have established that sel…shness on the part of managers will in-
evitably cause some M&A activity. The role of regulatory bodies such as
Takeover Panels, Competition Commissions, Securities and Exchange Com-
missions, Financial AccountingStandards Boardand theirequivalent inother
countries, is to ensure that the process of Mergers and Acquisitions is reason-
ably fair to all stakeholders involved with the companies. These institutionsCorporate Goverance 13
can also be utilized by …rms that are considered as doves to ward o¤ attack
from …rms that are hawks. Indeed, the presence of these regulatory bodies
can serve to reduce unbene…cial M&A activity, which may prove di¢cult to
get approval for from regulatory bodies.
5 The Behavior of Investment Banking Analysts
5.1 Incentive Compatibility
In this section weconsider the role of investment banks and the Analysts they
employ who forecast earnings of companies some of whom the investment
banks are advising on M&A activities. While the advisory department in the
banks is meant to be separate from the securities departments that forecast
company earnings, there may be some collusion. The so-called “Chinese
Wall” between the advisory divisions and securities division may be adhered
to. The collusion is driven by the fact that the Advisory division of the Bank
has an M&A advisory mandate whose fees depend on the size of the M&A
deal, in other words, the size of the company in value terms.
To maximize their payment, the analysts, some of whom participate in
these advisory mandates, become incentivized to present the company as
being well-managed and indeed the managers of the company are presented
as good managers even though they may be “bad” managers. The payment
structure for the analyst and indeed the advisory department of the invest-
ment bank is a percentage of the value of the M&A transaction. Then there
is an incentive for the analyst to in‡ate the true value of the …rms projected
earnings in order to increase fees. In our analysis we shall focus on just
the analyst since we have established that his behavior is similar to that of
his employers, the bank. In the analysis above there are …ve possible earn-
ing streams namely dlow;d¤;d¤¤;dhigh, and 1. For simplicity we consider two
earning scenarios, namely dlow, for poor performance of the …rm, and dhigh
for good performance of the …rm in the eyes of shareholders. Also, let b be
the probability that the expected …rm performance is bad and bp that the
analyst …nds out that the expected performance is bad, and bp < b.
Let us consider the preferences of the analyst, who is employed by the
investment bank that has an advisory contract with the company, during
period interval f0;Tg. the bank has to be involved in a competitive bidding
process for the renewal of the advisory mandate beyond this period. Let ICorporate Goverance 14
> 0, be the income earned by the analyst, during period (0;Tg. Let X be
future income of the analyst from having the contract of the investment bank
renewed beyond periodT, that periodfT +1;T +N). Let " be the e¤ort that
the analyst applies in the performance of his duties of forecasting earnings,
and D(") be the disutility of the degree of e¤ort. We also assume that the
analyst’s preferences U(:) are separable inmoney mand e¤ort e, givingutility
U(m), so that U(m;") = U(m) - D("): Seeing that the analyst is sel…sh will
report dhigh, seeing that the investment bank will lose its advisory mandate
in the next period, or trigger a review of the contract, if they forecast dlow.
The analyst will then forecast dhigh when they knowthat dlow, is the truthful
situation.
Let d0 be the performance at time t = 0, that the analyst observes (O)
where O ²fg;bg; and d< be the performance at time t = 0 that the analyst
reports (R) where <² fg;bg. Let ©(: j :) be the analyst’s expected utility
when the manager of the company reports d< having observed d0. Therefore,
©(dhigh j dhigh) = U (I +X)¡ D(") > 0 (28)
where the analyst reports good performance when the underlying state of
the company is good, receives his current income I, future income X after
applying e¤ort," , to perform his duties, experiencing disutility D(") from
e¤ort level, . For the bad state we have
©(dlow j dlow) = U (x) ¡ D(") (29)
and the analyst forecasts bad performance when the underlying performance
is bad, and they risk the investment bank losing its advisory contract. But
by being truthful the analyst creates a good chance of having the Bank’s
contract renewed and he earns future income, X, as (29) shows. Also
©(dhigh j dlow) = (1¡ Â)U(1+ X)¡ ÂU (X ¡ ·)¡ D(") (30)
where Â is the probability of the investment bank losing the contract, and
this is also the probability of being found out to have been untruthful about
the real state of a¤airs. Basically, (30) says that, if the analyst reports good
earnings when the underlying state of a¤airs is bad, then the bank could
survive dismissal and continue receiving current fees (I) and future income
(X) from re-appointed, withprobability (1¡Â), withthe company recovering
quickly. Expression (30) also recognizes the possibility of the bank losing theCorporate Goverance 15
contract with probability Â and the analysts only receiving future income,
X, if the Bank is re-appointed in future.
The term · in (30) is the legal liability of the investment bank and the
analyst, from being found not to have been truthful about the true state of
a¤airs in the company. In (30), if we set · su¢ciently high then the analyst
will not be tempted to report good when the underlying state of a¤airs is
bad since they do not wish to risk a high liability. How high should be? For
incentive compatibility we require that
©(dhigh j dlow) · ©(dlow j dlow) (31)
In other words, the analyst will experience a lower expected utility from
reporting a good state of a¤airs when the real situation is bad, than from
reporting the true bad state of a¤airs. Being truthful is more rewarding
than being untruthful. Expression (31) is the condition that ensures the
existence of a “Chinese Wall” between the advisory and securities divisions
of an investment bank.
6 Liability of Analysts and Attitude to Risk
The probability of the investment bank losing the contract · , can be set to
be exogenous in the sense that we can impose it, and besides it may depend
on the strategy of the investment bank. However, we can also set · to be
endogenousincaseswhere theInvestment bank’s actionsresultin the collapse
ofthecompany. Inthis case the loss toshareholderscanbe quanti…edexactly.
The regulators and legal institutions would be concerned with identifying the
minimum level of liability ·1 which ensures that (31) always holds. Then ·1
, is the minimum liability that would ensure incentive compatible behavior
from the investment bank, and hence reduce the possibility of untruthful and
perhaps corrupt behavior.
What factors determine the liability of untruthful behavior on the part
of the analyst? We can show that this liability depends on attitude towards
risk, potential future income, and the probability of being found out to have
in‡ated the true performance of the company. The probability of being
caught lying is also the same as that of losing the contract. To show this
we consider the level · that makes the incentive compatible equation hold
with equality and then substitute equations (29) and (30) in (31). We thenCorporate Goverance 16
consider a Taylor series expansion about X of U(I +X) and U(X ¡·), and
obtain
U (I + X) = U (X)+ IU0 (X) +0:512U"(X¤);X¤²(X;X + I) (32)
and
U (X ¡ ·) = U(X)¡ ·U0(X) + 0:5·2U"(X¤¤);X¤¤²(X ¡ ·;X) (33)
We can show that · satis…es the quadratic equation where
0:5U"(X¤¤)·2 ¡ U
0












and again Â is the probability of being found to have been untruthful and
the investment bank losing the advisory contract.






























































Then · depends onthe probability of being foundto have been untruthful
andlosingthecontract, Â;the income, I, and attitude torisk, ¸: By inspection
of(40) we see that whenthe probability of the analyst being untruthful being
established is high, one expects the value of · to increase. When the appetite
for risk increases, the liability ·;also increases.Corporate Goverance 17
7 Loss to Shareholders and Liability of the Analyst
This section seeks to link to loss to shareholders and the legal liability of an
analyst who in‡ates the true performance of a company. How large should
the …ne to analysts and the bank be? To answer this question we should
measure the loss to shareholders due to the actions of the analyst. We will
just focus on reporting earnings dlow and dhigh:
The value of the company under poor performance conditions dlow, using
a dividend discount model, is
S0 = (1¡ b)dlow=(r ¡ bROE) (41)
where r is the discount rate, b is the retention ratio and ROE is the return
on equity. When the company is a star-performer, then its value is
St = (1 ¡ b)dhigh=(r ¡ bROE) (42)
If the analyst reports dhigh when in fact dlow is the truth and is later realised,
then the loss to the shareholders is
L = (1¡ b)(dhigh ¡ dlow)=(r ¡ bROE) (43)
Then, the liability of the analyst should be set to equal the expected loss of
the shareholders as in expression (43).
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an integrated framework that classi…es man-
ager behavior and corporate governance, and show how a manager can use
M&A bids as a vehicle for maximising his own bene…ts, rather than share-
holder value. The M&A bid so targeted by the manager could simple be
for diversionary reasons, that seek to enable the manager to hold on to his
employment and bene…ts, even though he is not a good manager. We also
consider M&A activity that bene…ts both the managers and shareholders.
In this analysis, M&A activity is driven by the manager’s appetite for M&A
activity, both bene…cial and unbene…cial. The analysts, who are employed
by investment banks, that advise on the M&A activity, collude with man-
agement. The analysts forecast in‡ated earnings for a company because the
fees they earn as a portion of what the investment bank earns, are related toCorporate Goverance 18
the size of the transaction which in turn is determined by the in‡ated future
earnings. The agency con‡icts between shareholders, investment banks and
their analysts, and managers of the company, are central to our framework.
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